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KENTUCKY'S CONCEPT OF INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
Involuntary manslaughter, in Kentucky, is held to be the killing of another
in doing some unlawful act not amounting to a felony, and not likely to endanger
human life, and without intention to kill, or the killing of another while doing a
lawful act in an unlawful or negligent manner, where the negligence is not such
as to indicate a disregard of human life.'
The decisions concerning involuntary manslaughter are entirely devoid of
statutory guidance since Kentucky s sole statute venturing into the field of manslaughter is one establishing the punishment for voluntary manslaughter.In Sikes v. Comm onwealth, the Court stated that involuntary manslaughter
continues to be dealt with as a common law misdemeanor, pumshable by fine or
imprisonment in jail, or both, without limit. It seems, however, the common law
did not regard involuntary manslaughter so lightly. Hawkins says that the only
non-felonious homicides are those that are excusable or justifiable, 4 and Blackstone
is in accord that the cnme amounts to felony.- Bishop says, "In modern law, all
homicides which are cognizable by the cnminal courts are felomes."'
The Sikes case cites Conner v. Commonwealth' in the paragraph of its decision defining involuntary manslaughter as a common law misdemeanor. Although the Conner case was cited for a different proposition, the ruling in the
Sikes case is directly contra to the ruling in the Conner case on the classification of
involuntary manslaughter. In the Conner case, the Court ruled that in Kentucky
the court must look to the common law for the definition of involuntary manslaughter and that by the rules of the common law felonious homicide was divided into murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter. Furthermore, the court in the Sikes case makes no mention of the fact that their
opinion contains a ruling which is contra to a ruling in a case which it had cited
for authority.
The question arises, why does Kentucky rule that involuntary manslaughter
is a common law misdemeanor? It is believed that an analysis of voluntary manslaughter will reveal the answer.
A general definition of voluntary manslaughter is that it
is a homicide
committed with a real design to kill, but under such circumstances of provocation
that the law, in its tenderness for human frailty, regards them as palliating the
criminality of the act to some extent; as where one kills another in a fight ansing
upon a sudden quarrel, or upon mutual agreement, or in the heat of passion upon
great provocation. ' Kentucky, not being satisfied with this inclusive definition,

'Lewis v. Commonwealth, 301 Ky. 268, 191 S.W 2d 416 (1945); Lowe v.
Commonwealth, 298 Ky. 7, 181 S.W 2d 409 (1944); Commonwealth v. Mullins,
296 Ky. 190, 176 S.W 2d 403 (1943); Hunt v. Commonwealth, 289 Ky. 527, 159
S.W 2d 23 (1942); Jones v. Commonwealth, 213 Ky. 356, 281 S.W 571 (1926).
Ky. R1v. STAT. sec. 435.020 (1948).
'See 304 Ky. 429, 439, 200 S.W 2d 956, 959 (1947); accord, Cornett v.
Commonwealth, 282 Ky. 322, 138 S.W 2d 492 (1940); Spriggs v. Commonwealth, 113 Ky. 724, 68 S.W 1087, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 540 (1902).
1 HAwIss P. C. 79.
BL. CoiM. 193.
'2 BisHoP, CimuNtAL LAw sec. 617 (9th ed. 1923).
76 Ky. (13 Bush) 714 (1878).
'MAY, CaINAL LAw sec. 168 at page 271 (4th ed. 1938); Olds v. State, 44
Fla. 452, 33 So. 296 (1902); Ketring v. State, 209 Ind. 618, 200 N.E. 212 (1936);
State v. Boston, 233 Io. 1249, 11 N.W 2d 407 (1943); Neusbaum v. State, 156
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adds a killing wich is the result of negligence variously described as gross,"
reckless," reckless or gross,' reckless disregard," and reckless and wanton."
It is difficult to logically sustain a classification of any negligent manslaughter
as voluntary manslaughter since voluntary manslaughter is an intentional crime
with the great weight of authority accepting the maxim that it must be effected
with a real design to kill." Kentucky has, on occasion, attempted to justify her
position with the defunct rationalization that a man is presumed to intend the
consequences of his acts, and, thereby, a negligent manslaughter has been twisted
into the voluntary branch of manslaughter." This argument falls before the fact
that negligence, however gross, is never intent;"0 and it is unnecessary since the
crime of involuntary manslaughter was designed to cover negligent homicides not
amounting to murder."
It is believed, also, that the misnomer in certain instances of negligent manslaughter is the result of a justified desire on the part of courts to dispense justice
commensurate with the crime involved, in spite of the fact that it isn't the result
of careful application of rules of law. As has been observed, involuntary manslaughter is punished by fine and imprisonment in jail, a punishment that is not
severe enough for the culpability involved in many negligent manslaughters. It is
submitted that in certain cases those guilty of negligent manslaughter are sentenced under a voluntary manslaughter statute'0 in order that the state might meet
the exigencies of justice under a statute which affords a maximum sentence of 21
years in the penitentiary.'
Just as Kentucky probably deemed certain negligent manslaughters worthy
of penitentiary punishment, it is believed that they probably also felt that the
less revolting killings should deserve a relatively milder sentence. It is submitted
that this purpose was accomplished by defining and punishing involuntary manslaughter as a common law misdemeanor.
Indeed, there is a residuum of negligent homicides which are punished as

Maryland 149, 143 Atl. 872 (1928); State v. Evans, 177 N.C. 564, 98 S.E. 788
(1919); Commonwealth v. Carroll, 326 Pa. 135, 191 At. 610 (1937).
'Newcomb v. Commonwealth, 276 Ky. 362, 124 S.W 2d 486 (1939); Hill
v. Commonwealth, 239 Ky. 646, 40 S.W 2d 261 (1931); Davis v. Commonwealth,
204 Ky. 809; 265 S.W 316 (1924).
" Rains v. Commonwealth, 226 Ky. 173, 10 S.W 2d 643 (1928).
" Thacker v. Commonwealth, 263 Ky. 97, 91 S.W 2d 998 (1936).
" Boggs v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 558, 148 S.W 2d 703 (1941).
" Hawpe v. Commonwealth, 234 Ky. 27, 27 S.W 2d 394 (1930); Jones v.
Commonwealth, 213 Ky 356, 281 S.W 164 (1926).
14 Cases cited note 8 supra; see also Wims v. State, 60 Ga. App. 551, 4 S.E.
2d 418 (1939); State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P 2d 952 (1936).
" Largent v. Commonwealth, 265 Ky. 598, 97 S.W 2d 538 (1936); King v.
Commonwealth, 253 Ky 775, 70 S.W 2d 667 (1934); Embry v. Commonwealth,
236 Ky. 204, 32 S.W 2d 979 (1931); ROBERSON, KENTUCKY CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROcEDmuE sec. 392 (2nd ed. 1927).
" MORELAND, RATIONALE OF CniMINAL NEGLIGENCE 37 (1944).
"Nichols v. State, 187 Ark. 999, 63 S.W 2d 655 (1933); People v. Miller,
114 Cal. App. 293, 299 P 742 (1931); State v. Stansell, 203 N. C. 69
164 S.E. 580 (1932); MAY, supra note 8 at 174.
'0 Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 435.020 (1948).
"TiNcHER, PROPOSED STATUTORY REFOnm IN THE LAV OF NEGLIGENT
HOMIcmE IN KENTUCKY, 30 Ky. L. J. 341, 351 (1942). The reluctance of juries
to dispense extended jail sentences has been replaced by a statutory provision
prohibiting any jail sentence in excess of 12 months duration. Ky. REv. STAT.
sec. 431.075.
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involuntary manslaughter in Kentucky. A death which is the resulit of ordinary
Such decisions in effect establish
negligence is held to constitute the offense.'
the tort standard of care for involuntary manslaughter. Here, again, Kentucky
is in opposition to the overwhelming weight of authority. It is a general pnnciple of criminal law that something more than a lack of ordinary care is requisite
to criminal liability.2 t However, the application of any other higher standard of
care to involuntary manslaughter is precluded in Kentucky by the definition of
voluntary manslaughter as a homicide resulting from gross negligence. Since involuntary manslaughter is the lesser offense, the standard of care employed must
necessarily be lower because the culpable negligence involved in each instance is
the basis of liability. Therefore, the only workable standard of care beneath the
standard required by Kentucky in its fictitious voluntary negligent manslaughter
is ordinary care or the tort standard. Nevertheless, the classification of any negligent manslaughter as a voluntary one is fundamentally erroneous, and this error
should not be used to force the law of the sister offense of involuntary manslaughter into the realm of criminal liability for the lack of mere ordinary care.
Although it may be asserted that the classification of certain negligent manslaughters as voluntary manslaughter is justified in Kentucky by the fact that the
existing punishment for involuntary manslaughter is not severe enough due to
the rule that it is only a common law misdemeanor in Kentucky, such a procedure
is erroneous both logically and legally and is a breeder of confusion. Moreover,
anomalies of this character are utterly unnecessary although the exigencies of some
situations seem to demand them. The obvious answer to Kentucky s primary
need in the law of manslaughter is statutory reform-at least a statute placing
negligent manslaughter under involuntary manslaughter where it ought to be, and
pumshing the crime in a degree appropriate to the felony that it is, and defining
the standard of care as one appropriate to criminal liability.
JAMES DANIEL CORNETTE

THE RETREAT TO THE WALL DOCTRINE OF SELF-DEFENSE
In order to be excused on the grounds of self-defense in the early law of
homicide, it was necessary to gain the king s pardon.' Gradually, however, selfdefense became a legally recognized excuse for homicide, although some of its
most fundamental principles did not fully crystallize until modern times.
At the very beginning the so-called "retreat to the wall" doctrine became a
Embry v. Commonwealth, 286 Ky. 204, 32 S.W 2d 979 (1981).
"State v. Elliott, I Terry 250, 8 A. 2d 873 (Del. 1939); Pitts v. State, 132
Fla. 812, 182 So. 234 (1938); Croker v. State, 57 Ga. App. 895, 197 S.E. 92
(1938); People v. Hansen, 378 Ill. 491, 38 N.E. 2d 738 (1941); State v. Ela, 136
Me. 303, 8 A 2d 589 (1939); Scott v. State, 183 Miss. 788, 185 So. 195 (1939);
State v. Carter, 342 Mo. 439, 116 S.W 2d 21 (1938); Commonwealth v. Aunck,
342 Pa. 282,19 A. 2d 920 (1941); State v. Lingman, 97 Utah 180, 91 P 2d 457
(1939); Bell v. Commonwealth, 170 Va. 597, 195 S. E. 675 (1938); State v. Lawson, 128 W Va. 136, 36 S.E. 2d 26 (1946); MAY, CRIMINAL LAW sec. 174.
'

POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw

478 (2d ed., 1911).

"The defendant
deserved but needed the king s pardon."
1 Beale, Retreat From a Murderous Assault, 16 HArv. L. REv. 567 (1903).
is a doctrine of modem, rather than of medieval law."

